Deviating from standard possible-worlds semantics, authors belonging to what might be called the 'imperative tradition' of deontic logic have proposed a semantics that directly represents norms (or imperatives). The paper examines possible definitions of (monadic) deontic operators in such a semantics and some properties of the resulting logical systems.
Imperative Semantics and Basic Operators
Deontic logic, i.e. the logical analysis of obligation, permission and prohibition, is usually modelled by a possible-worlds semantics, in which among the set of worlds a deontic alternative or preference relation selects some as 'ideal' or 'better' compared to others. However, when there is an explicit set of given imperatives, a code of norms, or a number of specified tasks to complete for the agent, the appeal to some prohairetic notion for the meaning of ought seems out of place. Instead, what is obligatory then depends on whether it serves to satisfy the imperatives, avoid norm violations, or complete all the tasks.
In what might be termed the imperative tradition of deontic logic, a number of authors have deviated from the standard approach by giving semantics that relates the meaning of deontic operators to an explicitly given set of norms or imperatives. 1 The general idea behind imperative semantics is that to each command or imperative there is a descriptive sentence that describes what must hold iff this imperative is satisfied. If a set of imperatives is under 1 In [8] I mention semantics of Kanger [14] , Stenius [20] , van Fraassen [21] , and Alchourrón/Bulygin [1] . A more comprehensive list should also include Smiley [19] , and Niiniluoto [17] . Smiley, in a concept later endorsed by Ruth Barcan Marcus [15] and motivated by an Andersonian [2] definition of a constant representing the satisfaction of all normative demands, uses a 'normative code' consisting of propositions to define OA as meaning that there is a finite number of propositions p 1 , ..., p n in this code such that (p 1 ∧ ... ∧ p n → A) is a logical truth. Niiniluoto represents commands by a tuple containing a proposition p, where the truth of OA then depends on whether A is logically implied by one such p.
consideration, the set of corresponding descriptive sentences is then used of in the definition of deontic operators. The proper representation of this set is controversial: Directly representing imperatives by a set of descriptive sentences, as Kanger [14] and Alchourrón/Bulygin [1] have done, makes it appear as if norms can somehow be reduced to factual statements. Others like van Fraassen [21] , Niiniluoto [17] and myself [8] , have more cautiously represented imperatives by a set of objects that refer to states of affairs or propositions, thereby following the doctrine that norms bear no truth values. For reasons of readability I skip this intermediate step here, and use a set I ⊆ L [BL] of descriptive sentences that -in the language of a basic logic BLmean the sentences associated with some imperatives in the above sense. Deontic operators are then considered as giving information about the properties of this set of imperativeassociated descriptive sentences. The following definitions of operators O 1−5 , differing in strength, will be employed throughout: [19] operator, O 4 A is true iff a finite subset of imperative-associated sentences BLimplies A. Finally and similar to Alchourrón/Bulygin's [1] operator, O 5 A is true iff A is BL-implied by the set of all such sentences. Note that while all of O 1 − O 4 presuppose the existence of some sentence in I, O 5 A can hold for (BL-valid) sentences A even when I contains no object.
Discussing the general framework, I showed in [8] how a number of well-known systems of monadic and dyadic deontic logic can be reconstructed with respect to imperative semantics. The present paper examines some details and problems connected with monadic deontic logics facilitated by the above semantics. Sec. 2 gives logical systems for each of the above operators. Sec. 3 then examines systems that include several of these operators. In sec. 4 we take a look at possible semantic restrictions on the content of imperatives, and see what changes must be applied to logical systems to correspond to them. Sec. 5 examines more closely the definitions van Fraassen [21] proposed for O-operators, and provides a monotonic system to resemble his reasoning, and sec. 6 addresses a 'sceptical' definition of ought proposed by Horty [12] to deal with normative conflicts. Finally, in sec. 7 I give systems and semantics for extended languages that permit iterated and nested deontic operators of the types presented above. Let our basic logic be propositional logic PL. The alphabet of the language L [PL] has a set of proposition letters P rop = p 1 , p 2 , ..., truth-functional operators '¬', '∧', '∨', '→', '↔' and brackets '(', ')'. The set of sentences is defined as usual.
Logics DL
, in front of sets of sentences means their conjunction and disjunction, and e.g.
In the semantics, valuation functions v : P rop → {1, 0} define the truth of sentences A ∈ L [PL] as usual, A meaning the set of valuations v that make A true. means an arbitrary tautology, and ⊥ an arbitrary contradiction. We suppose a sound and complete axiomatic system for PL.
In this section, we examine deontic logics DL 
is closed under modus ponens and the following rule:
( being an arbitrary tautology): 
. Let ∆ = n ∆ n , where ∆ 0 = Γ, and
Clearly each ∆ n must be DL
We prove I, v |= A iff A ∈ ∆ by induction on A. We only give the case for A = O i B, the others are trivial: Suppose O i B ∈ ∆. Then B ∈ I and for all operators
) and PL-completeness we have DL
, and PL-completeness we have DL
, and PL-completeness we obtain DL 
. All other C ∈ I derive some contingent formula π 2 or (π 2 → π 1 ).
Since B contains no occurrence of π 1 , π 2 , if PL B → C then PL ¬B. The C ∈ I generated by clauses (d), (e) all are contingently true or false, so if there is a C ∈ I such that PL ¬C it must be due to clause (c). 
is a proposition letter π that does not occur in any
Let Γ f be any finite subset, and π be as before. Each set Γ f is satisfied by 
DL i

-Logics and Semantic Restrictions
So far, a set of sentences has been used to model what a set of imperatives demands, there being neither restrictions on the size of I, nor restrictions on the logical type of sentences in I. But concerning the size of I, it may be argued that a deontic logic should be applied only if there is at least one demand to be considered, since reasoning about what one ought to do when nothing is explicitly obligatory seems a borderline case. Concerning the elements of I, it may be argued that imperatives that demand the logically impossible or logically necessary are not 'proper', and one may also want to use a 'rationality restraint' to the effect that what the imperatives demand should be (jointly) satisfiable. Consider the following restrictions:
Consider the logics DL i 1 defined in sec. 2 and the following additional axiom schemes:
Warranted by the following theorems, the table below lists, for languages L [DL 
Theorem 4.1. The following systems are sound and (strongly) complete:
Soundness is again obvious. The completeness proofs are forthcoming adaptations of that for the DL i 1 -systems. When there is a specific axiom, it obviously ensures that the constructed I conforms to the given restriction. Consider cases 2,4,7 where there are no specific axioms:
, so by the construction ∈ I = ∅.
Case 4: We construct ∆ as before, but now define
The remainder is as before. Case 7: Let ∆ be as before, but now I = {A | O 5 A ∈ ∆ and PL A}. Suppose O 5 A ∈ ∆ and A / ∈ I, so |= PL A. But then trivially I |= PL A, and the remainder of the proof is as before.
is not compact if restricted by [R-3].
Proof:
To satisfy all of Γ, I must be empty, which is excluded by [R-0], so Γ is not satisfiable by [R-0]-restricted semantics. But any finite subset Γ f ⊆ Γ is satisfied by I f , v, where I f = {π}, and π is a proposition letter that does not occur in any A ∈ Γ f , v being arbitrary.
For the proof that DL
To satisfy all of Γ, I must contain tautologies only, which is excluded by [R-3] , yet it also cannot be empty due to the expected truth of O i , so Γ is not satisfiable by [R-3]-restricted semantics. But any Γ f is again satisfied by I f , v, as described above. 
Proof: Soundness is again obvious. For weak completeness, suppose {A} is DL i 1 -consistent. To demonstrate that there are I, v such that I, v A, we do a construction as in the proof of Theorem 3.1, i.e. form a disjunctive normal form of A, from the non-deontic conjuncts of a non-refutable disjunct obtain a valuation v that satisfies these, and from the deontic conjuncts construct sets O i and Q i as before. Again, let π be a proposition letter not occurring in A.
The construction ensures that I = ∅ (R-0), and for all
by PL-consistency of {A}, and B = π since π does not occur in A, so B / ∈ I and I, v ¬O 1 B. If i = 2 and B ∈ Q 2 , then no C ∈ O 2 is PL-equivalent to B due to (Ext 2 1 ) and PL-consistency of {A}, and no formula not containing π is PL-equivalent to π. So there is no C ∈ I s.t. PL (B ↔ C), and I, v ¬O 2 B.
and PL-consistency of {A}, and I = ∅ by the above construction, so I, v ¬O 3 B. Otherwise, no C ∈ O 3 PL-implies B again due to (Ext 3 1 ), (M 3 1 ) and PL-consistency of {A}, and if π does then B is tautological, but this was excluded.
) and PL-consistency of {A}, nor by I = {π} since a tautological B was excluded.
If the semantics employs more than one of the above restrictions, then generally there is a sound and (strongly) complete axiomatic system iff each of the semantics with just one of these restrictions has such a system, and the axiomatic system is obtained by including all axioms and rules of the systems for the singularly restricted semantics. However, this rule fails in one case: 
Proof:
Soundness is again obvious. For completeness we assume that {A} is DL 
and PL-consistency of {A}.
Van Fraassen's Imperative Logic
Van Fraassen [21] discusses three truth definitions of O-operators with respect to given imperatives. For all these operators, axiom scheme (C) does not hold, for van Fraassen is concerned with possibly conflicting imperatives, and argues that when there is a demand for A, and a demand for ¬A, we should admit the truth of OA ∧ O¬A, but the derivation of O(A ∧ ¬A) should be blocked. In van Fraassen's semantics, to each imperative i there is a class of possible outcomes i + in which i is fulfilled. His first definition of an O-operator reads:
[Df-F1] OA is true iff, for some imperative i that is in force, i + is part of the set of possible outcomes in which A is true.
In the terms used here, van Fraassen's definition may be reformulated as Again, this definition may be reformulated in the terms used here: Let {π 1 , . .., π n } ⊂ Prop be an arbitrary set of n proposition letters not occurring in δ, and σ be a function that maps min PL O F onto the set {π 1 , ¬π 1 ∧ π 2 , ..., ¬π 1 ∧ ...¬π n−1 ∧ π n } of n mutually exclusive PL-sentences. We then define:
, and for each consistent
There is no strongly complete axiomatic system DL Proof: 
The same holds for Γ 2 . Let n be the highest index of proposition letters occurring in
After explaining that semantics based on [Df-F3] satisfies the 'basic criteria' (the axiom schemes of DL "But can this happy circumstance be reflected in the logic of the ought-statements alone? Or can it be expressed only in a language in which we can talk directly about the imperatives as well? This is an important question because it is the question whether the inferential structure of the 'ought' language game can be stated in so simple a manner that it can be grasped in and by itself."
If what van Fraassen means by 'the logic of the ought-statements alone' is a monotonic axiomatic system, then van Fraassen's first question deserves a negative answer: There is a logic of ought-statements DL 
A i ) According to (F-1), agglomeration of contents of O 2 -obligations is admissible if these are jointly PL-consistent. 4 (F-2) then states that if O 2 -contents may not be added to the content of an O F -obligation, then there is an obligation to the contrary that goes with that content. So (F-1) and (F-2) now properly define the 'simple cases', where agglomeration of contents is admissible. . As now usual, let δ be a nonrefutable disjunct in a disjunctive normal form of ¬A. From its non-deontic conjuncts we again obtain a valuation v that satisfies them. As for the deontic conjuncts of δ, first let 
In a), we may have to replace B, C by r(L [P L] δ )-equivalents using (Ext F 1 ). We now define:
Proof: (a) is immediate from (F-1) and the definition of min PL O F (cf. the proof of Theorem 5.1).
be the function defined in the proof of Theorem 5.1. Let
Proof:
Immediate from Lemma 5.1, the construction of I, and the fact that σ(C) contains no proposition letters occurring in B or C.
It remains to prove that I satisfies all deontic formulas in δ and ∆: 
Saving a Twin Without Guilt -The Sceptical Ought O
S
In the long-standing philosophical dispute on the existence of moral dilemma and conflicting obligations, Barcan Marcus [16] provided the following Buridan's ass type example: Identical twins are in danger of being crushed to death by a rock. They are pinned down such that only one can be pulled free at a time. If nothing is done, the rock will soon kill them both, but if either twin is removed this will cause the rock to slide and kill the other. A mountain guide is liable for the lives of both twins. What are her obligations? As the example is set up, it suggests the co-existence of two conflicting obligations, i.e. the guide has to save one twin (T 1 ), and also save the other (T 2 ), T 1 contradicting T 2 . In logics DL Conee [5] , Donagan [6] , and Brink [3] have argued that morally there is no conflict: according to Conee, either act is permitted and neither absolutely obligatory, while for Donagan and Brink there only exists an obligation to save one twin or the other, but not two conflicting obligations to save either. Deontically, the dilemma was examined by Jacquette [13] and Horty [12] . Jaquette points out that van Fraassen's approach is unsatisfactory, since it does not hold that an obligatory act is also permitted: O F A → P F A is not a truth in DL F 1 , with P F A defined as ¬O F ¬A. So according to van Fraassen's notion of ought, either twin must be saved, but can only be saved at the price of guilt (for doing something forbidden). As an alternative to van Fraassen's logic, Horty, in accord with Donagan's and Brink's disjunctive proposal, considers a 'sceptical theory' of obligations, where something can be obligatory S only if there is no consistent set of norms that demand the contrary. With respect to our semantics, Horty's definition reads:
So A is obligatory iff all maximally consistent subsets of imperative-associated sentences derive A. 5 Let L [DL The result is welcome at first, for it seems that standard deontic logic, including agglomeration (C S 1 ) and 'ought implies can' (XI S 1 ), is the proper tool to represent the sceptic notion of ought. However, the problem is that now all the problems have disappeared: Conflicting imperatives and their impact on what is "sceptically obligatory" have become imperceivable in DL 
, which is a syntactic version of the disjunctive solution to Marcus's dilemma: the disjunction (A ∨ B) of two possibly conflicting imperative demands A, B is obligatory, unless there is a consistent set of imperatives that demands even ¬A ∧ ¬B. Hence one twin or the other must be saved. From (FS-1) and (XI F 1 ) we derive O F A → ¬O S ¬A, so what is obligatory according to van Fraassen's ought is at least 'permitted' in the sceptical sense. If guilt is a notion that attaches to a violation of a 'sceptical ought' only, then one may save a twin without guilt, but walking away remains forbidden. From the results of sec. 5 it is immediate that DL {2,F,S} 1 cannot be strongly complete. However we obtain the following result:
5 It might seem awkward that if I contains contradictory imperative demands, e.g. if I = {p1, ¬p1, p2} then with [Df-S] the set of truths is the same as for I = {p 2 }, i.e. the same as for an I without these demands. If the fulfillment of one of the demands is to remain obligatory, an alternative would be to have a "disjunction of oughts" instead of the "ought of a disjunction", and define: Γ j , so all I ∈ I − ⊥ are P L-consistent with at least one disjunct, so all I contain some
Γ j . Consider an I that does not contain any Γ j : Since I is not consistent with all A i ∈ Γ j , it must derive ¬ Γ j for each j, so it derives ¬ k j=2 
, and ¬O F ( Π) ∈ ∆ due to (FS-1), but then O S ¬ Π is derivable by the use of (FS-4), so Π is inconsistent with C I ∧ C II ∧ C III and hence cannot be in I . Now suppose C II is not vacuous. Then ¬O S ¬C II is derivable with (C S 1 ), (M S 1 ) and (Ext S 1 ), and O F C II is derivable by the use of (FS-3), furthermore due to (FS-1) we have O F (C I ∧ C II ) ∈ ∆, so again if C I ∧ C II ∧ C III is the only element of I and (1) 'Applicants shall be asked to produce statements in duplicate at their own costs.', (2) 'Students over 15y may be permitted to leave the grounds during breaks.'
To express a possible appearance of deontic notions within the scope of deontic operators, let the extended languages L [DL i ], 1 ≤ i ≤ 5, be defined as the smallest sets such that 
Proof:
For the left-to-right direction we do an induction on the construction of DL i : Suppose 
Immediate from the truth definitions for O i -operators and Corollary 7.2. So the truth definitions of O i -operators are equivalent to taking DL i as 'basic logic'.
Consider the following DL i -sentences: by the use of (C 5 ), (Ext 5 ), and (M 5 ). The same set I refutes theoremhood of (DB), I = {p 1 } refutes (D4), and e.g. an empty set I refutes (DE). Now (DT) is widely accepted in deontic logics modelled prohairetically. In semantics employing a deontic 'ideality' relation R, (DT) is valid if R is semi-reflexive, i.e. any world ideal from some standpoint is ideal with respect to itself. In Hansson's analysis of monadic deontic logic, where a set of deontic formulas is modelled by a non-empty basis of ideal among possible worlds, (DT) -if admitted as well-formed -is immediate from the universality of ideality (cf. [9] pp. 381-382). The same is true for Andersonian subsets of sanction-free worlds within a set of worlds linked by an alethic accessibility relation, where (DT) is derivable as soon as alethic necessities are made to hold at the actual world (cf. [2] p. 187 th. OM45). Føllesdal/Hilpinen [7] have called (DT) a "plausible-looking candidate for logical truth". And should not, as Prior ([18] pp. 255-256) has claimed, the acceptance of (DT) be trivial, reading it as 'It ought to be the case that what ought to be the case is the case' ?
The non-derivability of (DT) in any system DL i brings to the fore the distinction between what Barcan Marcus [15] Possibly one may want to admit commands like 'If it is not (already) obligatory to do α, then do α (by virtue of this command)!', and the addressee should be able to conclude that (now) she has an obligation to do α. However, such conditional expressions are not expressible in the language and semantics presented so far. Exploring how imperative semantics can be extended to cover such and other conditional expressions, and how to sail around the maelstrom of self-referentiality lurking behind the above example, must be left to further study.
Conclusion
When the question is what ought to be, according to some existing norms or imperatives, it seems natural to employ a semantics that models the meaning of deontic operators with respect to these imperatives, rather than some notion of absolute or relative 'betterness'. Existing modal systems relate rather simply to ought-operators of different strength, defined with respect to a set of sentences that describe what the imperatives demand. To mix such operators is, however, generally not an option if the resulting semantics is to be represented by a strongly complete axiomatic system, and the same holds for the use of restrictions on the number and kind of imperatives to be considered. To cope with conflicting imperatives, we may define a van-Fraassen-type operator that prohibits the agglomeration of contradicting demands, and a 'sceptical' ought-operator according to which something is obligatory only if there is no conflicting demand; both are best represented in systems that also contain operators which relate more directly to imperatives. In the light of the fact that natural languages do not prohibit the use of deontic modalities within imperative expressions, it is a welcome result that imperative semantics is possible, and sound and completely axiomatizable for logical languages that permit iterated and nested deontic operators. Here the roads of 'ought' defined evaluatively and 'ought' defined with respect to given norms part, as demonstrated by the fact that statements like 'it ought to be that what ought to be is the case' remain well formed, but are true accidentally only.
